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 Is European Union Law a Fully 
Self-Contained Regime? 
A Theoretical Inquiry of the Functional Legal 
Regimes in the Context of Fragmentation of 
International Law1 
 
LIANA ANDREEA IONIȚĂ 
 
 
SETTING THE SCENE 
 
At a time when the European Union is remodelling its institutional and 
legal architecture, as well as its borders, and redefining its priorities, identity 
and role in the international arena, this article aims to analyze to what extent the 
EU legal order constitutes a separate field of law, evolving towards a special 
legal regime or even a self-contained regime.  
An inquiry into the legal nature of the EU implies two perspectives of 
analysis, depending on the „level-of analysis problem”2: first of all, the analysis 
through the lens of international lawyers viewpoint and then, the analysis 
through the lens of EU lawyers perception. In the first case, if we look at the 
works of Dupuy3, Jan Klabbers4 or Nollkaemper5, we notice that the supremacy 
of international law prevails over any kind of legal regime and EU is seen as an 
international organization. However, in the second case, while building their 
arguments on the sui generis nature of EU and its legal particularities, scholars 
                                                          
1
  This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian 
Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/133675. 
2
  J.D. Singer, “The Level- of- Analysis Problem in International Relations”, K. Knorr, S. 
Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1961, p. 77. 
3  See, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Fragmentation du droit international ou des perceptions qu’on 
en a?”, EUI Working Papers, no. 14, 2006. 
4
  See, Jan Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009. 
5  See, Andre Nollkaemper, “Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law”, Amsterdam 
Center for International Law Working Paper, 2009. 
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and EU lawyers, like J.H.H. Weiler6, Piet Eeckout7, Bruno de Witte8, Gráinne 
de Búrca9 or K.S. Ziegler10, argue the increasing autonomy of this new EU legal 
order of international law.   
Considering the outlines of these two intellectual debates, the article 
will answer to the following research question: Is European Union law a 
potential candidate for autonomous legal systems disconnected from general 
international law ‒ the so-called self-contained regimes? Pro et contra arguments. 
My contention is that, even though EU law is not totally decoupled 
from general principles of international law, the new legal order of the EU has 
taken a historical turn towards self-containedness. In order to demonstrate this 
hypothesis, I will first look at the characteristics of self-contained regimes in the 
light of the debate on the fragmentation of international law (Section I) and then 
I will engage in an attempt to build pro et contra arguments in order to explain 
the historical turn of EU legal regime towards self-containedness (Section II). 
The methodological approach consists in providing a critical analysis, 
from an interdisciplinary point of view – political science, law and international 
relations ‒, of the Report on Fragmentation of International Law of the 
International Law Commission, concluded in 2006 and the ECJ case law in 
order to identify and explain pro et contra arguments, both in favour and against 
the following assertion: although EU law is not totally decoupled from general 
principles of international law, the new legal order of the EU has taken a 
historical turn towards self-containedness. 
The corpus of empirical studies on the European legal system is 
nowadays remarkably extensive, specialized and largely sophisticated. 
Nevertheless, EU is still a fertile laboratory for the research. The main focus of 
this article is to investigate from an interdisciplinary stance – political science, 
international relations and law ‒ a subject that is relatively new and innovative 
for the evolution of the EU legal scholarship. Aiming to explain the evolution of 
EU law towards a self-contained regime in international law, this article takes 
                                                          
6
  See, J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an 
Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
7
  See, P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011; P. Eeckhout, A. Biondi, S. Ripley (eds.), EU Law After Lisbon, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012. 
8
  See, Bruno de Witte, “‘Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European 
Community?”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, XXV, 1994, pp. 299-333. 
9
  See, Paul Craig, Gráinne de Burca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011. 
10
 See, Katja S. Ziegler, “International Law and EU Law: Between Asymmetric 
Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation”, in A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on 
the Theory of International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 268-327.  
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on the debate on the fragmentation of international law11, which represents the 
framework within which different features of modern law-making have been 
developed. 
According to the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) 
Report on “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law” (hereinafter the “ILC 
Report”), the background of fragmentation of international law has its roots in 
the globalization process, which has led to “the emergence of specialized and 
relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure”12. All these 
transformations have caused legal effects and implications in the field of law, 
which, in order to respond to technical and functional needs and preferences of 
the actors, have led to the emergence of new types of specialized (quasi) 
autonomous law. Therefore,  
 
“what once appeared to be governed by ‘general international law’ has 
become the field of operation for such specialist systems as ‘trade law’, ‘human 
rights law’, ‘environmental law’, ‘law of the sea’, ‘European law’ and even such 
exotic and highly specialized knowledges as ‘investment law’ or ‘international 
refugee law’ etc.- each posing their own principles and institutions”13.  
 
This is the birth of the so-called “self-contained regimes” that are often 
referred to as the different specialized branches of international law, whose rate 
of evolution was directly proportional to the fragmentation phenomenon. Legal 
scholars have long time debated the question of “self-contained regimes” that 
are considered to be special legal regimes with its own norms and principles, 
which operate in an autonomous way vis-à-vis general international law. Even 
though “strong forms of lex specialis” that are more or less decoupled from the 
lex generali, these self-contained regimes are not in concreto “closed legal 
circuits”. Therefore, we can observe that their relationship with the general 
international law is ubiquitous if we examine from the point of view of the 
general law of treaties (provided by the Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties 
of 1969) to which all these regimes have claimed its binding force14.   
From the international law perspective and taking into account all 
mentioned above, one could not agree that EU law is a self-contained regime, 
                                                          
11
  ILC Report, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law‒Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law (Analytical Report) Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi 
[online], UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 2006, available at http://daccessddsy.un.org/doc 
/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed on 12 September 
2013). 
12
  Ibidem, p. 11. 
13
  Ibidem. 
14
  Ibidem, pp. 81-82. 
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bearing in mind that the application of general international law is not totally 
excluded from the EU law. However, from the EU law perspective, there are 
sufficient characteristics of the EU legal system that qualify it for this category 
of strong form of lex specialis. Although EU law is not totally decoupled from 
general international law because of its origins and operation as a regime 
constituted under the provisions of the general law of treaties, the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union has firmly declared the “new legal 
order of international law”15. Regarding the relationship between EU law and 
international law, the former has developed its domain réservé regarding its 
independence and participation within the international order, as well as its own 
norms and rules of recognition, claiming its “own legal system”16, a subsystem 
of international law. Therefore, one could strongly argue that EU legal regime is 
likely to appear as self-contained. 
 
 
SELF-CONTAINED REGIMES IN THE LIGHT 
OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In this section, I will provide some conceptual preliminaries on the 
development of self-contained regimes in international law. I will first explore 
why the fragmentation of international law has encouraged the development of 
such legal regimes and then I will reflect on what they actually constitute by 
pointing out its historical usages and the current meanings according to 
contemporary legal scholars.  
The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has reckoned 
with this issue in the context of the fragmentation of international law and 
before further explaining the emergence of the legal regimes, I will address the 
meaning of this phenomenon. The expanding scope of international law and its 
tendency to develop specialized techniques have turned into a ubiquitous 
presence in the international law scholarship throughout the years. The 
specialization of international law (in particular subject-areas such as human 
rights, trade, the environment and so on, that have become bodies of law), on 
one hand, and the expansion of international law (the proliferation of 
international judicial institutions, organizations, courts and tribunals), on the 
other hand, have substantially contributed to the fragmentation of international 
law. These were the major factors responsible for the fragmentation. The study 
                                                          
15
  ECJ, Case 26/62, NV Algemene Treansport- en Expenditie Onderneming van Gend en 
Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 5 February 1963 (hereinafter “Case 
Van Gend en Loos”), p. 2. 
16
  ECJ, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 15 July 1964 (hereinafter “The Costa v. ENEL 
Case”), p. 593. 
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of such phenomenon raises fundamental question regarding the unity of 
international law, its substance and components: how can international law be 
broken apart if it was not a unitary body of law? But international law has never 
been a unified system and the lack itself of centralized organs (no centralized 
legislative body and institutions, no independent authority, no compulsory court 
system and no centralized enforcement) has made the fragmentation 
unavoidable.  
The more expanded and specialized the international law becomes, the 
more it “is a victim of its own success”17 and “a cultural and historical 
product”18 , going through four main phases: the first three identified by David 
Kennedy ‒ the Treaty of Westphalia, the League of Nations and the UN 
Charter19 ‒ to which Leathley adds the current phase of globalization20. As we 
observe “the globalization of international law”21 and the redefinition of the 
international order within the context of the emergence of international non-
state actors, a revolutionary wave resulted in the fall of the classical 
international law logic and the appearance of different “foyers de droits”22. 
These „foyers de droits” describe the different legal bodies around specific 
subject-areas that have been gravitating independently the international system 
and operating in their own regime of application and interpretation of the 
international norms and by their own rules and legal practices23. Their tendency 
is to claim their autonomy from the general principles of international law and 
become more or less self-contained or self-sufficient. 
In 1999, the President of the International Court of Justice, Judge 
Stephen M. Schwebel, addressed to the United Nations General Assembly on 
the topic of the proliferation of international tribunals and expressed his 
concerns that “the proliferation of international courts may jeopardize the unity 
of international law and, as a consequence, its role in inter-State relations”24. In 
2000 and 2001, Gilbert Guillaume (the following President of the International 
Court of Justice) has raised awareness in his speeches to the UN General 
Assembly regarding this “postmodern anxiety”25 and pointed out that “judges 
                                                          
17
  C. Leathley, “An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation Of International 
Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, vol. 40, no. 1, 2007, p. 263. 
18
  Emmanuelle Jouannet, Le droit International, PUF, Paris, 2013, p. 7. 
19
  David Kennedy, “The Disciplines of International Law and Policy”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, vol. 12, no. 1, 1999, pp. 83-101. 
20
  C. Leathley, “An Institutional Hierarchy… cit.”, p. 264. 
21
  Alain Pellet, “Vers une mondialisation du droit international?”, in La Mondialisation au-
delà des mythes, S. Cordelier & al. (eds), La Découverte, Paris, 2000, pp. 93-100.  
22
  J. Chevallier, L’Etat postmoderne, LGDJ, Paris, 2004, p. 4. 
23
  Emmanuelle Jouannet, Le droit International, cit., pp. 56-69. 
24
  Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the UN, 1999. 
25
  Martti Koskenniemi, P. Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 15, no. 3, 2002, pp. 553-579. 
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themselves must realize the danger of fragmentation in the law, and even 
conflicts of case-law, born of the proliferation of courts”26. This is the first time 
that the phenomenon of fragmentation is mentioned and officially recognized 
and ever since, it became the new research approach embraced by most legal 
scholars and international lawyers when defining the international legal order. 
The ILC established in 2002 a Study Group, which was chaired by Professor 
Martti Koskenniemi. This Study Group has conducted a research on this topic 
and issued in 2006 a final report on the “Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law” (the ILC Report). According to this Report, there are very important 
effects that have emerged naturally with this phenomenon: fragmentation has 
challenged the coherence of the international legal system and has led to 
conflicts between international norms and different interpretations. Therefore, 
the ILC Report addresses the topic from the point of view of the emergence of 
special law (lex specialis) as exception to the general law, by analyzing the 
conflicts between specialized norms of different legal regimes and general 
international law and between different types of special law27. 
The most important problem that arises with the fragmentation of 
international law and creates incoherence is “the splitting up of the law into 
highly specialized ‘boxes’ that claim relative autonomy from each other and 
from the general law”28. These are the so called “self-contained regimes” or 
“special regimes”. 
Taking into consideration the technical and functional rationalities, new 
forms of lex specialis have developed more and more in different domains of 
law, such as trade law, human rights law, environmental law, EU law and so on, 
on one hand; on the other hand, we have faced the proliferation of specific 
international courts and tribunals that have embodied the political will of certain 
groups of States29, regionally or internationally established (for example the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Court of Justice of 
the EU, European Court of Human Rights, International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, International Arbitration Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). 
In Koskenniemi’s Report, self-contained regimes are defined as strong 
forms of lex specialis30 and “systems or subsystems of rules that cover some 
particular problem differently from the way it would be covered under general 
law”31. Their raison d’être is the specialization of the law in specific domains, 
following the preferences of their members, in order “to provide a more 
                                                          
26
  Gilbert Guillaume, Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the UN, 2000. 
27
  ILC Report, pp. 30-101. 
28
  Ibidem, p. 13. 
29
  C. Leathley, “An Institutional Hierarchy… cit.”, pp. 264-265. 
30
  ILC Report, p. 80. 
31
  Ibidem, p. 68. 
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effective protection for certain interests or to create a more context-sensitive 
regulation of a matter than what is offered under the general law”32.  
Self-contained regimes are perceived like “sub-species of regimes”33, 
which from the point of view of Krasner’s regime theory, are “sets of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”34. 
If the self-contained regime is understood as a self-sufficient regime, 
“independent of external means or relations” and “complete in itself”35, this idea 
would imply that this kind of international regime would be totally isolated 
from general international law. Three observations are in place. Firstly, if in 
theory such regime could exist hermetically isolated from general law, however, 
in practice there is no sign of its existence in concreto. Secondly, from an 
international law perspective, there is no regime that could be labelled as “self-
contained” because it has not formed “a closed legal circuit”36. Even though in 
its sphere of application prevails its own rules (lex specialis), these should be 
interpreted as exceptions from the general law and therefore, in a limited way. 
Thirdly, as ILC has already concluded, every self-contained or special regime links 
up to general international law, at least regarding the two following aspects: 
 
“First, it [general international law] provides the normative background 
that comes in to fulfill aspects of its [self-contained regime’s] operations not 
specifically provided by it. […] Second, the rules of general law also come to 
operate if the special regime fails to function properly. […] Also the rules of 
State responsibility might be relevant in such situations”37. 
 
All in all, these legal regimes are not hermetically isolated from general 
international law because their creation, conditions of validity and operation, as 
well as the rules on State responsibility are still determined by principles of 
general law. Therefore, taking into consideration all above, the ILC Report 
mentioned that “self-contained regimes” could be misleading and even suggested 
that the term of “special regime” could better characterize the current situation. 
 The conceptualization of the term of “self-contained regimes” in the 
legal discourse was coined by two very important judgments of the 
International Court of Justice38. The term of self-contained regimes entered the 
                                                          
32
  Ibidem, p. 97. 
33
  Math Noortmann, Enforcing International Law: From Self-help to Self-contained 
Regimes, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, 2005, p. 131. 
34
  S.D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, p. 2. 
35
  Cf. Online Oxford English Dictionary. 
36
  ILC Report, p. 82. 
37
  Ibidem, p. 100. 
38  See, PCIJ, Case A-1, S.S. ”Wimbledon” Brittany, France, Italy and Japan c. Germany, 28 
June 1923 (hereinafter “ The S.S. Wimbledon Case”); ICJ, Case Concerning United States 
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international legal vocabulary first as a concept fixing a problem of treaty 
interpretation with regard to the relation between primary international 
obligations, claiming that “the provisions relating to the Kiel Canal in the 
Treaty of Versailles are therefore self-contained”39. Those provisions were 
complete in themselves and since there were specific norms (forming a special 
legal regime) in Article 380 of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles with regard to 
the Kiel Canal, the other general applicable articles were not to be used or 
provide any help in the interpretation of those particular norms. Moreover, in 
the early 1980s, the term was used in the case of secondary norms by the 
International Court of Justice, which stated through its decision in the Tehran 
Hostages Case that legal norms of diplomatic law established by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations are to be applied independently from the 
international general law of state responsibility: 
 
“The rules of diplomatic law, constitute a self contained regime 
which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving state’s obligations regarding 
the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions 
and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and 
specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such 
abuse. These means are, by their nature, entirely efficacious”40.  
 
International scholars of international law have associated ever since an 
increasing level of autonomy to the self-contained regimes. Treaties or set of 
treaties (forming a specific treaty regime) started to be seen in international law 
as legal (quasi) autonomous sub-systems which developed their own rules and 
norms and excluded more or less the application of general international law. 
Based on the International Court of Justice’ ruling in the 1980s, the definition 
provided by Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski to the concept of self-contained 
regime does not refer to any legal subsystem of international law, but it is 
applied to “particular category of subsystems, namely those that embrace a full, 
exhaustive and definitive, set of secondary rules”41. Moreover, Simma and 
Pulkowski agree with the observations of the Report on their modus operandi as 
forms of “strong lex specialis”, whose main particularity is their tendency to 
“exclude the application of the general international law on state responsibility, 
in particular resort to countermeasures by an injured state”42. 
                                                                                                                                              
Diplomatic and Consular Staff In Tehran United States of America v. Iran, 24 May 1980 
(hereinafter “The Tehran Hostages Case”). 
39
  The S.S. “Wimbledon” Case, pp. 8-9. 
40
  The Tehran Hostages Case, p. 86. 
41
  Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, “Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 3, 2006, p. 493. 
42
  Ibidem, p. 495. 
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According to the ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, 
there are various regimes that are often qualified as self-contained: human 
rights law, WTO law, European/EU law, humanitarian law, diplomatic law, 
spatial law and so on43.  
 
 
IS EUROPEAN UNION LAW A FULLY SELF-
CONTAINED REGIME? 
 
 The EU law as a self-contained regime is a topic to which scholars 
haven’t given greater attention in the context of fragmentation of international 
law. However, the EU sui generis legal system is constantly evolving and 
facing an increasing degree of autonomy from the general international law and 
in this context, a discussion regarding its self-containedness needs to be placed 
at the core of EU law scholarship. This issue is studied from two perspectives. 
By analogy to Singer´s theory of “the level-of-analysis” applied to the 
international relations field, we identify pro and contra arguments depending 
either on the level of public international lawyers and second, or on the level of 
scholars in EU law. Therefore, I agree with the observations of the ILC´s 
Special Rapporteur Arangio-Ruiz:  
 
“Generally, the specialists in Community law tended to consider that the 
system constituted a self-contained regime, whereas scholars of public 
international law showed a tendency to argue that the treaties establishing the 
Community did not really differ from other treaties.”44 
 
In Section II, I will first identify the most important arguments both 
supporting and denying the self-contained regime of the EU law and then, 
taking all these into account, I will eventually state and explain my position on 
the topic. 
 
 
Arguments Against EU Law as A Self-Contained Regime 
 
Among the contra arguments, the first thing to be considered is the 
EU’s foundation in the sphere of international law. Therefore, in international 
law, EU is considered an international organization and has been established 
under provisions of international law, namely the Vienna Convention on the 
                                                          
43
  ILC Report, p. 68. 
44
  G. Arangio-Ruiz, “Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-fourth Session”, ILC 
Yearbook, vol. I, 1992, p. 76. 
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Law of Treaties on 1969. Thus, EU as a subject of international law has 
recognized the binding force of the general law of treaties.  
The second reason takes into account the omnipresence of general law. 
Even though the fragmentation of international law has influenced the 
emergence of different special regimes, the ILC Report stated that “no regime is 
self-contained”45. If we perceive the set of rules established by self-contained 
regimes as hermetically isolated from the general law, we would be inclined to 
affirm that EU law is not a closed legal circuit.  
The third argument derives from the previous one and is based on the 
fact that, according to the ILC Report, “every special regime links up with 
general international law”46, especially regarding the conditions of validity of its 
establishment by the founding treaties. Firstly, the EU legal order cannot exist 
beyond the sphere of international law; the conditions of its operation, its 
international legal personality and its capacity to act globally derive from 
general law. Concurring Pellet, Simma and Pulkowski state that from the 
international law point of view, the EU law is to be considered as a subsystem 
as long as its operations are not independent from the consent of the states 
themselves, so that any significant evolution regarding the EU legal system 
needs the prior approval of EU members47. Moreover, there are cases when the 
general international law prohibits deviations and that would be the case of 
rules having the character of jus cogens or even other types of general 
international norms, like some human rights treaties, that do not permit 
derogation by way of lex specialis. However, the derogation remains eventually 
a question of interpretation of the general law48. 
The fourth argument denying the full self-contained character of the EU 
legal system regards the question of international responsibility of the EU 
Member States. According to the Report, the linkage between the EU regime 
and the general international law is notable in cases of possible fall-back to the 
general international law of the state responsibility due to the regime’s failure: 
“Once a self-contained regime fails, recourse to general law must be allowed”49. 
Consequently, Simma and Pulkowski have identified two hypothetical scenarios 
in which “the mechanisms under the EC [European Community] Treaty fail to 
give effects to the obligations members have assumed under the Treaty”50, 
which would provoke a fallback to the international rules of state responsibility. 
First of all, there is the situation regarding the continuous breaches of EU law 
by a Member State despite the Commission´s recommendations and finally the 
                                                          
45
  ILC Report, p. 100. 
46
  Ibidem, p. 101. 
47
  Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, “Of Planets and the Universe…cit.”, p. 516. 
48
  ILC Report, p. 60. 
49
  Ibidem, p. 82. 
50
  Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, “Of Planets and the Universe…cit.”, pp. 516-517. 
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judgment of the Court, when “the only option to induce compliance that 
remains for the injured state is a fallback on unilateral countermeasures”51. The 
second scenario regards the state-to-state reparation in case of violation of EU 
law. Simma and Pulkowski highlight the fact that Member States are entitled to 
fall back on general rules, including resort to countermeasures in their claim, in 
the event that the European legal system doesn’t provide an “explicit provision 
for a mechanism that would allow inter-state claims of reparations” or the 
existing procedures doesn’t prove efficacious; the authors go beyond this 
explanation and, revisiting the case law of the ECJ – benefiting from its 
appointed role as the guardian of the law ‒, propose a solution to be taken into 
consideration: “Recourse to the rules on state responsibility will not be 
necessary if the European Court of Justice accepts […] to accommodate inter-
state claims for damages within European legal system”52. 
 Taking into consideration the arguments stated above, there are legal 
scholars53 that claim that EU legal system is not conceptually a fully self-
contained regime, since the resort to general rules and principles of international 
law, like the state responsibility, is not entirely excluded.  
 
 
Approaches Favoring EU Law as A Self-Contained Regime 
 
It is essential to firstly point out the sui generis character of the EU law 
in general international law, which would make it plausible to reiterate the 
European exceptionalism and the unique capacity of the EU to display 
important legal features into the international field54. I have presented above 
reasons sustaining the fact that the international law is an integral part of the EU 
legal order; however, there are limits that prove the complexity of this 
relationship and from the legal perspective of the EU scholars, the issue of the 
EU law as a self-contained regime is an essential feature characterizing the 
relationship between the special set of rules of the EU legal order and the 
general international law. The sui generis character of the EU law generates 
 
“The extent to which the EC is a self-contained regime, that is, a distinct 
system or subsystem of international law whose secondary rules (the rules of 
change or the rules governing the implementation, operation and amendment of 
the Treaties) are determined by the regime itself, that is, are special to the 
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  Ibidem, 517. 
52
  Ibidem, p. 518. 
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  See, Bruno Simma, Dirk Pulkowski, “Of Planets and the Universe…cit.”; G. Conway, 
“Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States”, European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 13, no. 3, 2002, pp. 679-695. 
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  G. Nolte, H.P. Aust, “European Exceptionalism”, Global Constitutionalism, vol. 2, no. 3, 
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regime itself and are not simply the application of conventional secondary rules 
of general public international law”55. 
 
The second argument is the evolution of EU legal system in terms of 
autonomy which has passed through various stages in time. Over the centuries, 
the European construction faced a unique phenomenon and according to J.H.H. 
Weiler, one of the leading scholars of European law, the EU has advanced in 
the context of “the breach and alienation from international law and its 
transformation into a constitutional legal order”56. It has been concluded that the 
EU legal system has evolved from its international status nascendi of a typical 
treaty-based system (an international organization) into a European regime, 
which from the point of view of the legal architecture, its own enforcement and 
sanctioning powers, special institutional design embodying the legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers, its multi-level network governance and quasi-
federal particularities, is the very picture of nation states.  
The establishment of this self-contained regime took place in the 
context of a set of founding treaties and treaties modifying its legal and 
institutional design in order to face the complex economic, politic and legal 
integration process. It was in 1963 that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
declared that the EU (the European Economic Community at that time) was a 
“new legal order of international law”57. According to Morten Rasmussen, “the 
key step towards establishing what the court would term ‘a new legal order of 
international law’ in the judgment had already been made by the member states 
when they ratified the Treaties of Rome, due to the treaties’ special legal and 
institutional nature”58. This momentum is the historical turn of the EU law 
towards self-containedness because the Court’s judgment in the Van Gend en 
Loos Case has advanced the constitutional direction of the evolution of the EU 
legal order, “revolutionizing European law”, as Rasmussen has described it59. 
The case law of the ECJ has had a valuable contribution to the 
development of the EU law into such a legal regime. The Court’s reasoning in 
the Costa v. ENEL Case has advanced the sui generis character of EU legal 
system in relationship to the general international system:  
 
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC [European 
Economic Community] treaty has created its own legal system which, on the 
entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
member states and which their courts are bound to apply. [...] creating a 
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  G. Conway, “Breaches of EC Law…cit.”, p. 680. 
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  J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe…cit., p. 293. 
57
  The Van Gend en Loos Case. 
58  Morten Rasmussen, “Revolutionizing European Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos 
Judgment”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 12, no. 1, 2014, p. 139. 
59
  Ibidem. 
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community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane”60. 
 
The third important argument is touching upon the normative basis of 
the EU legal regime, which makes it self-contained – the acquis communautaire 
of the EU. The experts in EU law, like C. Delcourt and L. Azoulai61, have 
argued that this concept is rather characterized by ambiguity due to the dynamic 
character of the EU legal order and its never-ending evolution. The 
development of the acquis communautaire, which if the corpus of EU law 
(including treaties, legislation, international agreements, judgments of the ECJ, 
fundamental rights provisions) from 1958 to date is a significant proof of the 
fact that the EU self-contained regime has established its own principles, norms 
and rules in its sphere of application. Therefore, EU law has advanced its own 
reserved domain and rules of recognition and has built its own “principles of 
direct effect, supremacy and the doctrine of fundamental rights”, which have 
“taken place through the interpretative activity of the ECJ and not always with 
the full support of all Member States”62. 
The fourth argument refers to the special relationship of the EU legal 
order vis-à-vis general international law in the light of the doctrine of exclusive 
state responsibility. By analogy to the ILC Report’s observations on self-
contained regime, we can agree that the EU regime is a special case of lex 
specialis (that is, like a sort of exception to the general rule), which “take better 
account of the particularities of the subject-matter to which they relate; […] 
regulate it more effectively than the general law and follow closely the 
preferences of their members”63. Therefore, certain international rights and 
obligations are not applied to the EU law or are applied in a limited way. 
According to Professor J.H.H. Weiler, the particularities of the EU self-
contained regime draw on the fact that special regime’s procedures and rules 
prevail against the general law, even regarding the state responsibility in 
international law, along with the principles of reciprocity and countermeasures, 
in case of infringement of international obligations:  
 
“The Community legal order is a truly self-contained legal regime with no 
recourse to the mechanism of state responsibility, at least as traditionally 
understood, and therefore to reciprocity and countermeasures, even in the case 
                                                          
60
  The Costa v. ENEL Case, p. 593. 
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of actual or potential failure. Without these features, so centric to the classic 
international legal order, the Community truly becomes something ‘new’”64.  
 
By contrast to the hypothesis developed by Simma and Pulkowski and 
presented here above, regarding the ultimate recourse to the general public law 
and to the classical principal of state responsibility in case of various lacunae in 
EU law, there are a few important aspects to be considered in order to sustain 
the EU legal regime as self contained. First of all, the Treaty of Lisbon has 
developed different mechanisms and alternative methods of dispute 
settlement65, which involve a reasoned opinion from the Commission, with 
which Member States concerned should comply; otherwise, the matter may be 
brought before the ECJ for an alleged infringement of obligations under the 
treaties, or even more, for non-compliance with the Court’s decisions, which in this 
case will lead to penalty payment, as it is stipulated in the TEU post-Lisbon: 
 
“Article 258 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the 
State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down 
by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. 
 
Article 260 
1. If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member State 
has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required 
to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. 
2. If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not 
taken the necessary measures […], it may bring the case before the Court […]. 
It shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by 
the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances.”66  
 
Moreover, the case law of the ECJ has established through a series of 
decisions the rejection of the use of important principles of general law, like 
state responsibility, countermeasures and reciprocity mechanisms, on the basis 
of the fact that the EU treaties provide all the appropriate remedies in situations 
where Member States haven’t fulfilled their obligations stipulated under the 
treaties. Here are some relevant judgments: 
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  See, Art. 5.2 (g) TEU. 
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Is European Union Law a Fully Self-Contained Regime? 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 1  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53
“ […] it must be pointed out that in no circumstances may the member 
states rely on similar infringements by other member states in order to escape 
their own obligations under the provisions of the treaty.”67 
“In fact the Treaty is not limited to creating reciprocal obligations 
between the different natural and legal persons to whom it is applicable, but 
establishes a new legal order which governs the powers, rights and obligations 
of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for taking cognizance of 
and penalizing any breach of it. […] Therefore the fact that the Council failed to 
carry out its obligations cannot relieve the defendants from carrying out 
theirs.”68 
“[…] a Member State may not rely on the fact that other Member States 
have also failed to perform their obligations in order to justify its own failure to 
fulfill its obligations under the Treaty […]. In the legal order established by the 
Treaty, the implementation of Community law by the Member States cannot be 
made subject to a condition of reciprocity.”69  
 
All these decisions mentioned above explain how the EU has gradually 
reached greater autonomy from the international law due to the case law of the 
ECJ, which proved to be the driving force behind the constituency of the EU’s 
self-contained regime.  
This line of reasoning takes the current analysis to another important 
argument supporting the thesis statement: the Court’s judgments have 
contributed to the development of the current special mechanisms and 
techniques of the EU legal system, acting “as a gatekeeper by regulating the 
relationship between international law and Community law”70.  
In this regard, it is relevant for the present study to take a closer look at 
the Kadi Case, whose judgment ‒ one of the most controversial and extensively 
debated in the public sphere ‒ “has been associated with a dualist conception of 
the interplay between the international and the Union legal order”71. The subject 
of the Kadi Case is referring to the implementation by the EU of UN Security 
Council resolution regarding the sanctions (an assets freeze) imposed to a 
possible supporter of Al-Qaida, who was accused of terrorist acts. Therefore, it 
has been questioned the primacy of UN law over EU law and possible conflicts 
that might arise on the basis of the relationship between obligations under 
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Charter of the United Nations and obligations deriving from the EU treaties 
with which EU Member States have to comply72. 
Taking into account the reasoning of the Court, first, in September 
2005, before the Court of First Instance (CFI)73, which is a constituent court of 
the ECJ, and second, in September 2008, before the ECJ itself, the substantial 
difference between the two separate judgments has determined EU lawyers to 
argue that the dualist approach could be explained in correlation with the 
strengthening of the autonomy of EU law74. Gráinne de Búrca has identified, on 
one hand, the “strong constitutionalist approach” of the first ruling of the CFI, 
which was based “on the systemic unity of the international legal order and the 
EU order, and on a hierarchy of legal authority within this integrated system”, 
and on the other hand, the “strong pluralist approach” of the final ruling of the 
ECJ, which “presented the European Union as a separate and self-contained 
system which determines its relationship to the international order in 
accordance with its own internal values and priorities rather than in accordance 
with any mutually negotiated principles or norms”75. 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi Arabian national, was included in 2001 
on a list published by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security 
Council, among other entities and persons who were associated with Osama bin 
Laden, Al-Qaeda or the Taliban and whose assets were supposed to be frozen. 
Kadi has filed a petition to the CFI, in 2001, demanding the annulment of the 
Regulation 881/2002, adopted by the European Commission in order to 
implement a series of UNSCR Resolutions related to the freezing of funds, 
because this Regulation has violated his right to property and to a fair hearing. 
The first ruling delivered by the CFI76 in 2005 has rejected Kadi’s petition, on 
the grounds of the stipulations of the Charter of the United Nations and mainly 
of the Article 103, claiming the prevalence of the members’ obligations under 
the Charter of the United Nations, to the detriment of any other obligation under 
an international treaty and convention77. Moreover, in cases related to 
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international peace and security, members of the UN invest the Security 
Council with the power to act on their behalf: 
 
“Article 24 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf.”78 
 
The Charter of the United Nations claims that all the members of the 
UN are bound by the decisions of the Security Council, that they are required to 
respect and implement, directly or through other forms of action:  
 
“Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”79 
“Article 48 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council 
may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of 
which they are members.”80 
 
These main arguments invoked by the CFI have revealed the pre-
eminence of the decisions of the Security Council over the Community law and 
have characterised the relationship between the international legal order under the 
UN law and the Community legal order under the EU law in the following terms: 
 
“From the standpoint of international law, the obligations of the 
Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations 
clearly prevail over every other obligation of domestic law or of international 
treaty law including, for those of them that are members of the Council of 
Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and, for those that are also members 
of the Community, their obligations under the EC Treaty.”81 
 
In its ruling, CFI has expressed that this “primacy extends to decisions 
contained in a resolution of the Security Council”82 and that “Member States 
may, and indeed must, leave unapplied any provision of Community law, 
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whether a provision of primary law or a general principle of that law, that raises 
any impediment to the proper performance of their obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations”83. 
If the first ruling of the CFI has stated that EU law was bound by UN 
law, the final ruling of the ECJ in September 2008 has concluded that “the 
relationship between international law and the Community legal order is 
governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can 
permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional 
principles of the Community”84. It emphasized the autonomy of the EU legal 
order and the need to address in this context the conflict that might arise between 
international law and special regimes of law, as it is the present EU law. 
The provisions stipulated in Article 103 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which states that the principle of the primacy of obligations under UN 
law prevail over any other obligations of the Member States: 
 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”85. 
 
However, the ECJ has reasoned that the Article 351 TFEU is applied, 
determining the relationship between international law and EU law: 
 
“The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between 
one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on 
the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties”86. 
 
Therefore, international obligations undertaken by EU’s Member States 
before their EU membership cannot have effect on the obligations arising from 
the EU treaties. Interpreting these provisions, ECJ stressed the autonomy of the 
EU legal system:  
 
“The question of the Court’s jurisdiction arises in the context of the 
internal and autonomous legal order of the Community, within whose ambit 
the contested regulation falls and in which the Court has jurisdiction to review 
the validity of Community measures in the light of fundamental rights”87.  
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Moreover, the ECJ explained in its reasoning that the constitutional 
principles of the EU treaties are not to be violated by any obligations deriving 
from international agreements. Therefore, if conflicts may arise, the Court 
cannot “permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very 
foundations of the Community legal order”, namely the fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and is empowered to determine the effect of the international 
obligations in the domestic order of the EU: „it is for the Court to review in the 
framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by the Treaty”88. 
Furthermore, the approach of the ECJ vis-à-vis general international 
law provided in its Kadi judgment enables us to come to the heart of the 
constitutionalisation of the EU law. “After Kadi, it has become increasingly 
common among EU lawyers to conceptualise autonomy in a strong 
constitutional sense”89. Declaring the primacy of EU law, not only over the 
domestic constitutions of the member states, but also over the international 
order established by the Charter of the United Nations, the Kadi judgment has 
advanced a redefinition of the relationship between EU law and international 
law. Reconsidering the position of the new legal order of the EU within the 
international legal order, different legal perspectives have been developed in the 
light of conceptualization the autonomy of the EU law. Lavranos emphasizes 
that this special autonomy is one of the “elements that make up the very 
foundation of the Community legal order”, reflecting “the essentials of 
European constitutional law”90. Moreover, Henri de Waele has interpreted the 
ECJ decisions in the terms of change of hierarchy, stating that EU law is 
hierarchically superior to international legal provisions, which has “put the 
independent character of the Community legal system beyond doubt, and 
underscored the unprecedented nature of European law once and for all”91. 
Considering the fact that the EU legal system operates in different important 
fields, like trade security and defence92, without the application of certain 
principles of public international law, namely the countermeasures and 
reciprocity mechanisms, I recognize its self-contained character, even though it 
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might be conceptually debatable by different scholars, as a relevant feature for 
the evolution of the European constitutionalism.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Therefore, it is clear that there are both arguments against and favoring 
EU law as a self-contained regime, depending on the level of analysis of the 
international law scholars and respectively, EU law scholars. This inquiry is 
based on the empirical analysis of the relation between the general international 
law and the self-contained regimes, and particularly the EU legal regime, in the 
light of the fragmentation of international law – phenomenon which has led to 
the emergence of these specialized and (quasi) autonomous bodies of law. The 
construction and analysis of the pro et contra arguments are grounded on the 
critical analysis, from an interdisciplinary perspective, of the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation of International Law, concluded in 2006 and the ECJ case law. 
Analyzing both arguments in favor and against the self-contained character of 
the EU legal regime, this research confirms the initial hypothesis that, albeit the 
omnipresence of international law and the special relationship between EU law 
and general international law, the EU legal order has taken a historical turn 
towards self-containedness.   
On the one hand, the reasons why the self-contained character of the EU 
regime is extensively debated and conceptually denied refer to the following 
aspects: (1) the EU’s foundation in international law as a international 
organization and subsystem of international law; (2) the omnipresence of 
general law admitted by the majority of legal scholars and the inexistence in 
concreto of the fully self-contained regimes; (3) the existing linkage between 
the legal regimes in general and EU regime in particular and general 
international law, in terms of validity of the establishment of the legal regimes; 
and (4) the complex problem of the fallback on public international law state 
responsibility and countermeasures mechanisms in case the mechanisms 
inherent in the EU legal order fail.  
On the other hand, the EU legal regime is characterized by a set of 
accurate features sufficient to justify the historical turn towards self-
containedness: (1) the sui generis character and modus operandi of the EU legal 
order and its peculiar characteristics that differentiate it from any other regime 
of international law; (2) the constant evolution of the EU system in terms of 
autonomy, from the typical treaty- based regime of international law into a sui 
generis regime and a new legal order of international law (different from the 
traditional general order); (3) the consolidation of the acquis communautaire, 
which is the proof of the never-ending evolution of the EU law, independently 
of the general rules, and the establishment of its own constitutional legal order, 
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accommodating fundamental inherent principles, norms, procedures and 
mechanisms within its sphere of operation; and (4) the rejection of the use of 
general principles of public international law, namely state responsibility, 
countermeasures and reciprocity mechanisms, in case of breaches of law, and 
the role of the ECJ as the engine of the evolution towards self-containedness of 
the EU law, under the aegis of conclusive judgments. 
Having stated the pro et contra arguments articulated in this article, 
conclusions can be provided to the research question posed at the outset of this 
inquiry. Therefore, the EU law represents a potential candidate for self-
contained regime. I agree that the EU legal system is not a closed legal circuit 
because it connects with the general law in special circumstances stated above 
and clearly detailed in the Report of the fragmentation of international law. 
Thus, one can observe the effects of the public international law in the domestic 
sphere of the EU law and for these reasons, one admits the fact that it is not 
fully isolated regime. However, according to the arguments presented above, I 
notice that the EU has taken a historical turn towards self-containedness, 
progressively building its own autonomy vis-à-vis general law and 
revolutionizing EU law.  
 
 
 
